Foundations of Science 12 (3):257-268 (2007)
AbstractIn pure science, the standard approach to non-epistemic values is to exclude them as far as possible from scientific deliberations. When science is applied to practical decisions, non-epistemic values cannot be excluded. Instead, they have to be combined with scientific information in a way that leads to practically optimal decisions. A normative model is proposed for the processing of information in both pure and applied science. A general-purpose corpus of scientific knowledge, with high entry requirements, has a central role in this model. Due to its high entry requirements, the information that it contains is sufficiently reliable for the vast majority of practical purposes. However, for some purposes, the corpus needs to be supplemented with additional information, such as scientific indications of danger that do not satisfy the entry requirements for the corpus. The role of non-epistemic values in the evaluation of scientific information should, as far as possible, be limited to determining the level of evidence required for various types of practical decisions
Similar books and articles
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science.Wenceslao J. González - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 96 (1):85-112.
The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models.Sven Diekmann & Martin Peterson - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218.
Assessing the Role of Non-Epistemic Feminist Values in Scientific Inquiry.William A. Rottschaefer - 2003 - Behavior and Philosophy 31:225 - 249.
The Dynamics of Scientific Concepts: The Relevance of Epistemic Aims and Values.Ingo Brigandt - 2012 - In Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 75–103.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Cutting the Gordian Knot of Demarcation.Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-243.
The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):568-595.
Understanding Scientific Study Via Process Modeling.Robert W. P. Luk - 2010 - Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78.
A Normative Analysis of Nursing Knowledge.Renzo Zanotti & Daniele Chiffi - 2016 - Nursing Inquiry 1 (23):04-11.
With All This Pseudoscience, Why so Little Pseudotechnology?Sven Ove Hansson - 2022 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 2:226-241.
References found in this work
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.
The Fixation of Belief.Charles S. Peirce - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 37-49.