Values in pure and applied science

Foundations of Science 12 (3):257-268 (2007)
Abstract
In pure science, the standard approach to non-epistemic values is to exclude them as far as possible from scientific deliberations. When science is applied to practical decisions, non-epistemic values cannot be excluded. Instead, they have to be combined with scientific information in a way that leads to practically optimal decisions. A normative model is proposed for the processing of information in both pure and applied science. A general-purpose corpus of scientific knowledge, with high entry requirements, has a central role in this model. Due to its high entry requirements, the information that it contains is sufficiently reliable for the vast majority of practical purposes. However, for some purposes, the corpus needs to be supplemented with additional information, such as scientific indications of danger that do not satisfy the entry requirements for the corpus. The role of non-epistemic values in the evaluation of scientific information should, as far as possible, be limited to determining the level of evidence required for various types of practical decisions
Keywords Corpus  Values in science  Epistemic values  Non-epistemic values  Scientific values  Applied science  Pure science
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DOI 10.1007/s10699-007-9107-6
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Perspectives on Risk.Sven Ove Hansson - 2004 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 8 (1):10-35.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Inductive Inconsistencies.Carl G. Hempel - 1960 - Synthese 12 (4):439-69.
Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.

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Citations of this work BETA
Understanding Scientific Study Via Process Modeling.Robert W. P. Luk - 2010 - Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78.
Cutting the Gordian Knot of Demarcation.Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-243.

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