Why punitive intent matters

Analysis 81 (3):426-435 (2021)
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Abstract

Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.

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Nathan Hanna
Drexel University

Citations of this work

Punitive intent.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):655 - 669.

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References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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