Authors
Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University
Abstract
This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence.
Keywords substance dualism  mind  moral realism  intuitions  inherent value
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DOI 10.1017/apa.2015.10
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References found in this work BETA

A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.

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Citations of this work BETA

Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
Our Animal Interests.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.
How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
Intuition and Counterfactual Scenarios.Scott Forschler - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):169-178.
Two Solutions to the Neural Discernment Problem.Bradford Saad - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2837-2850.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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