A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism

Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21--35 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence.

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Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University

Citations of this work

Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
Our animal interests.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.
How Valuable Could a Person Be?Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):264-277.
How valuable could a material object be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
Two solutions to the neural discernment problem.Bradford Saad - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2837-2850.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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