A ‘Mere Cambridge’ Test to Demarcate Extrinsic from Intrinsic Properties

Acta Analytica 33 (2):199-225 (2018)

Abstract
I argue that a ‘mere Cambridge’ test can yield a mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, partition of properties between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. Unlike its rivals, this account can be extended to partition 2nd- and higher-order properties of properties. A property F is intrinsic, I claim, iff the same relation of resemblance holds between all and only possible instances of F. By contrast, each possible bearer of an extrinsic property has a determinate relation to some independently contingent concrete object. Such a relation can hold for concrete and abstract objects, of objects which are not remotely duplicates, and can vary from one possible duplicate to another. I compare this with accounts which do not allow extension to 2nd- and higher-order properties and give preliminary rebuttals for some main difficulties raised for the account advocated.
Keywords Intrinsic .   Extrinsic .   ‘Mere Cambridge’ change  Lewis  Francescotti
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-017-0336-1
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Extrinsic Properties.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595-637.

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