Accepting Moral Luck

In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two identical agents drive recklessly around a curb, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two identical corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. Only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. I offer three arguments for that view, and, in doing so, I exemplify a general way to advance the moral luck debate. First, I argue against an account of moral responsibility that implies that the judges are equally blameworthy. Second, I argue that the killer driver is more blameworthy than the merely reckless driver. Third, I locate an alternative sense in which the agents in each case pair are morally on par.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Accepting Moral Luck and Taking Responsibility in Public Health Crises.Daniel Tigard - 2023 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (1):34-40.
Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):105-118.
Individual Moral Responsibility and Luck.David Worster Concepcion - 2002 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.
Getting Moral Luck Right.Lee John Whittington - 2015 - In Duncan Pritchard & Lee John Whittington (eds.), The Philosophy of Luck. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 205–218.
The objects of moral responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.
Getting Moral Luck Right.Lee John Whittington - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):654-667.
Responsibility Without Wrongdoing or Blame.Julie Tannenbaum - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7:124-148.
Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement.Daniel Story - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:601-616.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-11-22

Downloads
1,626 (#6,844)

6 months
193 (#18,791)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert J. Hartman
Ohio Northern University

Citations of this work

Free Will and Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2022 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), A Companion to Free Will. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 378-392.
Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):136-150.
Moral Luck and Unfair Blame.Martin Sand & Michael Klenk - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (4):701-717.
A Defence of the Control Principle.Martin Sand - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):765-775.
Moral Luck and Unfair Blame.Martin Sand & Michael Klenk - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-17.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Responsibility From the Margins.David Shoemaker - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 59 references / Add more references