A Note on the Logic of One of Descartes’ Arguments

International Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):181-184 (1975)
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Abstract

To his question whether the heated wax, Despite its changing properties, Remains the same piece of wax, Descartes simply answers that it does and that no one would judge otherwise. It is argued that the reason why this is so can be neither empirical nor can it be of a logical deductive kind. The reason is transcendental, That is, The concept of that which does not change during change is a necessary condition, I.E., It is a category. It is a necessary condition for any language to be used to talk about and to describe the world of change

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