Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365 (1983)

Abstract
It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064702
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View.Michael Moehler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):82-99.
Acceptance, Values, and Probability.Daniel Steel - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:81-88.
Are Disagreements Honest.Tyler Cowen & Robin Hanson - forthcoming - Journal of Economic Methodology.
Values in Pure and Applied Science.Sven Ove Hansson - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (3):257-268.

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