Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses

Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365 (1983)
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Abstract

It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses.

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Citations of this work

Remarks on Hansson’s model of value-dependent scientific corpus.Philippe Stamenkovic - 2023 - Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 10 (1):39-62.
The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View.Michael Moehler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):82-99.
Acceptance, Values, and Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):818-828.
Acceptance, values, and probability.Daniel Steel - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:81-88.

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References found in this work

The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Gambling with truth.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Cambridge,: MIT Press.

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