Colour-dispositionalism and its recent critics

Dispositionalist accounts of colour concepts are now largely discarded. But a number of recent and influential objections to this type of theory can be readily answered providing the dispositionalist account contains the key elements it should---which actual versions in the literature do not. I explicate some of the conceptual components needed in such an account once we correctly understand the anthropocentricity of the colour concepts involved. When these components are incorporated into dispositionalism, including one crucial distinction in particular, some powerful seeming objections against this revised dispositionalism fail. In addition, dispositionalism has extra advantages over the far more popular physicalist theories, and I therefore contend that we should explore vigorously this kind of enriched dispositionalist account
Keywords Color  Disposition  Epistemology  Perception  Vision
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DOI 10.2307/2653406
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Mohan P. Matthen (2001). Our Knowledge of Colour. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (Supplement):215-246.

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