Crisp's ‘ethics without reasons?’: A note on invariance

Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):50-54 (2007)
Abstract
Crisp is right to detect a clash between Dancy's leading formulation of holism about reasons and the phenomenon of invariance. Replying to Crisp on behalf of the particularist, I suggest a better formulation of holism modelled on a standard treatment in the philosophy of language of context-sensitive expressions. Key Words: context-sensitivity • Crisp • Dancy • holism • invariance • particularism.
Keywords Dancy   holism   Crisp   invariance   particularism   context-sensitivity
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DOI 10.1177/1740468106072784
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