Change in View

MIT Press (1986)

Authors
Gilbert Harman
Princeton University
Abstract
Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $5.00 used (67% off)   $15.00 direct from Amazon   $15.00 new    Amazon page
ISBN(s) 0262580918  
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,049
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.

View all 182 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
292 ( #19,871 of 2,260,641 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #105,876 of 2,260,641 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature