Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and skepticism about folk psychology

Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185 (2012)
Abstract
In recent years it has become more and more difficult to distinguish between metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For example, proponents of the minimalist theory of truth hold that moral claims need not express beliefs in order to be (minimally) truth-apt, and yet some of these proponents still reject the traditional cognitivist analysis of moral language and thought. Thus, the dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has come to be seen as a dispute over the correct way to characterize our psychology: are moral judgments beliefs, or a kind of pro-attitude? In this paper, I argue that this distinction, too, is difficult to maintain in the light of a reasonable skepticism about folk psychology. I conclude by suggesting some new possibilities for the analysis of moral language that look beyond this distinction. I begin by briefly reviewing some contemporary positions in metaethics on cognitivism and non-cognitivism, that are intended to emphasize the supposed psychological differences between the two views. I show that the appearance of a clear difference between these views depends on one's having a very strong commitment to the context-independence and completeness of certain concepts of folk psychology. I then argue for a moderate skepticism about folk psychology. I conclude that folk concepts like ?belief? are not sufficiently well-defined to settle this metaethical dispute
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.569921
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Spreading the Word.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Expressivism and Moral Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
Knowledge of Grammar as a Propositional Attitude.Jonathan Knowles - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):325 – 353.
Cognitivism About Imperatives.Josh Parsons - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):49-54.
Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions.A. Scarantino - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):729-768.
Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation.Michael Smith - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.
Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation.Martin Davies & Tony Stone - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 53-82.
Non-Cognitivism and Consistency.Nick Zangwill - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (4):465-484.
Appetitive Besires and the Fuss About Fit.Steven Swartzer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988.
Folk Psychology as a Theory.Ian Ravenscroft - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-09-16

Total downloads

271 ( #11,832 of 2,164,580 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

43 ( #6,172 of 2,164,580 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums