Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):953-954 (1999)

Abstract
Color -order systems highlight certain features of color phenomenology while neglecting others. It is misleading to speak as if there were a single “psychological color space” that might be described by a rather simple formal structure. Criticisms of functionalism based on multiple realizations of a too-simple formal description of chromatic pheno-menal relations thus miss the mark. It is quite implausible that a functional system representing the full complexity of human color phenomenology should be realizable by radically different qualitative states
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x99322214
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Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.

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