Doubts About Conceptual Analysis

In Reasoning, meaning, and mind. New York: Oxford University Press (1999)
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Abstract

A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Contrary to Jackson's claim, the rejection of analyticity is based on consideration of central cases.

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Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

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Schauer's Anti‐Essentialism.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (2):182-214.

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