Does knowledge intellectualism have a Gettier problem?

American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (59):149-159 (2022)
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Knowledge intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge. Knowledge intellectualism has a Gettier problem, or so many of its critics allege. The essence of this problem is that knowledge-how is compatible with epistemic luck in a way that ordinary propositional knowledge is not. Hence, knowledge-how can allegedly be had in the absence of knowledge-that, a fact inconsistent with knowledge intellectualism. This paper develops two responses to this challenge to knowledge intellectualism. First, it is not clear that propositional knowledge is incompatible with the forms of epistemic luck with which knowledge-how is allegedly compatible. Second, existing cases intended to serve as counterexamples to knowledge intellectualism are flawed, and revised versions of these cases no longer elicit the judgments necessary to challenge knowledge intellectualism.



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Keith Raymond Harris
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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