Continental Philosophy Review 41 (3):367-383 (2008)

Authors
Graham Harman
American University in Cairo
Abstract
Manuel DeLanda is one of the few admitted realists in present-day continental philosophy, a position he claims to draw from Deleuze. DeLanda conceives of the world as made up of countless layers of assemblages, irreducible to their parts and never dissolved into larger organic wholes. This article supports DeLanda’s position as a refreshing new model for continental thought. It also criticizes his movement away from singular individuals toward disembodied attractors and topological structures lying outside all specific beings. While endorsing DeLanda’s realism, I reject his shift from the actual to the virtual.
Keywords DeLanda  Realism  Virtual  Assemblage  Essence
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DOI 10.1007/s11007-008-9084-7
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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The Disconnection Thesis.David Roden - 2012 - In A. Eden, J. H. Søraker, E. Steinhart & A. H. Moore (eds.), The Singularity Hypothesis: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment. Springer.
Deleuze, DeLanda and Social Complexity: Implications for the ‘International’.Robert Deuchars - 2010 - Journal of International Political Theory 6 (2):161-187.

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