Distinctions without differences: Commentary on Horgan and Tienson's connectionism and the philosophy of psychology

Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):373 – 384 (1997)
Horgan and Tienson do a wonderful job of explicating the dynamical system perspective and contrasting that view with classical AI approaches. However, their arguments for replacing a classical conception of connectionism with system dynamics rely on philosophical distinctions that do not make a difference. In particular, (1) their generalized version of Man's three levels of analysis collapses into itself; (2) their description of attractor dynamics works better than their metaphor of forces; and (3) their versions of “soft laws” and physical laws amount to the same thing.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089708573227
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,765
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Marr's Computational Theory of Vision.P. S. Kitcher - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
4 ( #705,173 of 2,214,577 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #408,824 of 2,214,577 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature