Authors
Stevan Harnad
Université du Québec à Montréal
Abstract
According to "computationalism" (Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn 1984; Dietrich 1990), mental states are computational states, so if one wishes to build a mind, one is actually looking for the right program to run on a digital computer. A computer program is a semantically interpretable formal symbol system consisting of rules for manipulating symbols on the basis of their shapes, which are arbitrary in relation to what they can be systematically interpreted as meaning. According to computationalism, every physical implementation of the right symbol system will have mental states.
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Why and How We Are Not Zombies.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):164-67.

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