Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):207–225 (2007)

Authors
Elizabeth Harman
Princeton University
Abstract
It seems that if abortion is permissible, then stem cell research must be as well: it involves the death of a less significant thing (an embryo rather than a fetus) for a greater good (lives saved rather than nine months of physical imposition avoided). However, I argue in this essay that this natural thought is mistaken. In particular, on the assumption that embryos and fetuses have the full moral status of persons, abortion is permissible but one form of stem cell research is notFthe practice of creating embryos and then destroying them to extract cell..
Keywords stem cell research  abortion  fetus  moral status  embryo
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00489.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
A Defense of Abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Practical Ethics.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):264.

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