Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on consciousness: The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem

Abstract

Why, oh why do we keep conflating this question, which is about the uncertainty of sensory information, with the much more profound and pertinent one, which is about the functional explicability and causal role of feeling? " _Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought? What are the conditions for the_ _possibility of experience at all?_ " That's not the right question either. The right question is not even an epistemic one, about "thought" or "knowledge" but an "aesthesiogenic" one: How and why are there any feelings at all?

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2009-01-28

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Stevan Harnad
McGill University

Citations of this work

There us No Concrete.Stevan Harnad - 2004 - Res Cogitans 1 (1).

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