Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):68-90 (2014)

Authors
Robert J. Hartman
Tulane University
Abstract
The problem of moral luck is that a general fact about luck and an intuitive moral principle jointly imply the following skeptical conclusion: human beings are morally responsible for at most a tiny fraction of each action. This skeptical conclusion threatens to undermine the claim that human beings deserve their respective eternal reward and punishment. But even if this restriction on moral responsibility is compatible with the doctrine of the final judgment, the quality of one’s afterlife within heaven or hell still appears to be lucky. Utilizing recent responses to the problem of moral luck, I explore several Molinist accounts of the final judgment that resolve both theological problems of moral luck. Some of these accounts entirely eliminate moral luck while others ensure that the moral luck involved in the judgment is overall good luck. (DOWNLOAD the published version at the external link below.)
Keywords Moral Luck  Molinism  Moral Responsibility
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.5840/faithphil2014265
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 50:115-151.
Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. State University of New York Press. pp. 141--166.
Taking Luck Seriously.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (11):553-576.
Molinism, Open Theism, and Soteriological Luck.Mark B. Anderson - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (3):371-381.
The Metaphysics of Original Sin.Michael C. Rea - 2007 - In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;. pp. 319--356.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.
Accepting Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.
Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.
Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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