How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence without Proximity

Abstract
The most influential arguments for scientific realism remain centrally concerned with an inference from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories. Recently, however, and in response to antirealists' objections from radical discontinuity within the history of science, the arguments have been refined. Rather than target entire theories, realists narrow their commitments to only certain parts of theories. Despite an initial plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces significant challenges. In this article, I outline four prerequisites for a successful selective realist defence and argue that adopting a comparative sense of success both satisfies those requirements and partially in consequence provides a more compelling, albeit more modest, realist thesis
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axr059
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References found in this work BETA
Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide Et Impera.Timothy D. Lyons - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):537-560.
When Empirical Success Implies Theoretical Reference: A Structural Correspondence Theorem.Gerhard Schurz - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):101-133.
On the Predilections for Predictions.David Harker - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Kuhnian Mode of HPS.Samuel Schindler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4137-4154.
Explanatory Fictions—for Real?Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1741-1755.
Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Matthias Egg - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):axu025.

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