Intuitive Dilation?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):252-262 (2015)
Abstract
Roger White objects to interval-valued credence theories because they produce a counterintuitive “dilation” effect in a story he calls the Coin Game. We respond that results in the Coin Game were bound to be counterintuitive anyway, because the story involves an agent who learns a biconditional. Biconditional updates produce surprising results whether the credences involved are ranged or precise, so White's story is no counterexample to ranged credence theories
Keywords biconditional  dilation  ranged credence  credence  updating  interval
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.185
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References found in this work BETA
In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.

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