Philosophy of Science 63 (3):54 (1996)

Authors
William L. Harper
University of Western Ontario
Robert Disalle
Western University
Abstract
Newton's methodology emphasized propositions "inferred from phenomena." These rest on systematic dependencies that make phenomena measure theoretical parameters. We consider the inferences supporting Newton's inductive argument that gravitation is proportional to inertial mass. We argue that the support provided by these systematic dependencies is much stronger than that provided by bootstrap confirmation; this kind of support thus avoids some of the major objections against bootstrapping. Finally we examine how contemporary testing of equivalence principles exemplifies this Newtonian methodological theme
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DOI 10.1086/289935
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
Glymour on Evidential Relevance.David Christensen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.

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