Authors
Daniel W. Harris
Hunter College (CUNY)
Abstract
Intentionalism is a research program that seeks to explain facts about meaning and communication in psychological terms, with our capacity for intention recognition playing a starring role. My aim here is to recommend a methodological reorientation in this program. Instead of a focus on intuitive counterexamples to proposals about necessary-and-sufficient conditions, we should aim to investigate the psychological mechanisms whose activities and interactions explain our capacity to communicate. Taking this methodologi- cal reorientation to heart, I sketch a theory of the cognitive architecture underlying language use that I have defended elsewhere. I then show how this theory can be used to give an account of non-communicative language use—a phenomenon that has long posed a challenge to intentionalism.
Keywords Grice  Intentionalism  Methodology in philosophy of language  modularity of mind  Mechanistic explanation  Self-directed speech  Inner speech  Metasemantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Reimagining Illocutionary Force.Lucy McDonald - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Reimagining Illocutionary Force.Lucy McDonald - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Intentionalism and Bald-Faced Lies.Daniel W. Harris - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
A Gricean Theory of Malaprops.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (4):446-462.
Searle Vs. Searle on Language, Speech, and Thought.Sanford Goldberg & Guiming Yang - 2014 - Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (3):352-372.
Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and Philosophy of Mind.Vivienne Brown - 2007 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (1):25-62.
Function of Infant-Directed Speech.Marilee Monnot - 1999 - Human Nature 10 (4):415-443.
On Communicative Intention And Saying/implicating Distinction.Ivana Stojanovic-Prelevic - 2011 - Facta Universitatis, Series: Linguistics and Literature 9 (2):107-114.
Communication and Shared Information.Marija Jankovic - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
Theory of Speech Acts.Muhammad Ali Abdullāhi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 6 (24):91-119.
A Paradox in Intentionalism.Daniel O. Nathan - 2005 - British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (1):32-48.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-08-14

Total views
235 ( #46,537 of 2,498,734 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #30,251 of 2,498,734 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes