Internal realism, religious pluralism and ontology

Philosophia 36 (1):97-110 (2008)
Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability” and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.
Keywords Philosophy of religion  Religious pluralism  Internal realism  Internalist pluralism  Hilary putnam  Conceptual schemes  Cultural diversity  Ontology
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9089-1
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