Language, thought, and communication

Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:270-298 (1975)
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Abstract

Consider the idea that a natural language like English is in the first instance incorporated into the system of representation one thinks with. This ‘incorporation’ view is compared with a translation or ‘decoding’ view of communication. Compositional semantics makes sense only given the implausible decoding view.

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Citations of this work

(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.
What's wrong with semantic theories which make no use of propositions?Jeff Speaks - 2014 - In Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks (eds.), New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford University Press.
Concepts, analysis, generics and the canberra plan.Mark Johnston & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):113-171.
References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 361-386.
The methodology of naturalistic semantics.Michael Devitt - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (10):545-72.

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