Mind in a Humean World

Metaphysica 12 (2):213-229 (2011)
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The paper defends Humean approaches to autonomous mental causation against recent attacks in the literature. One important criticism launched at Humean approaches says that the truth-makers of the counterfactuals in question include laws of nature, and there are laws that support physical-to-physical counterfactuals, but no laws in the same sense that support mental-to-physical counterfactuals. This paper argues that special science causal laws and physical causal laws cannot be distinguished in terms of degrees of strictness. It follows that mental-to-physical counterfactuals are supported—or not supported—by laws in just the same way as are physical-to-physical counterfactuals.



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Citations of this work

Reductionism Today.Michael Esfeld - 2013 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 17:89-101.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

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