Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking

In Jerome Lang & Ulle Endriss (eds.), Computational Social Choice 2006. University of Amsterdam (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The problem of the aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. The dificulty lies in the fact that a seemingly reasonable aggregation procedure, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective outcome. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such dilemmas as the discursive paradox. So far, three procedures have been proposed to overcome the paradox: the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures on the one hand, and the merging approach on the other hand. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, the question is how good the merging approach is in tracking the truth, and how it compares with the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
70 (#228,134)

6 months
8 (#341,144)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Stephan Hartmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Gabriella Pigozzi
Université Paris Dauphine

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.
Democratic answers to complex questions: an epistemic perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2006 - In Matti Sintonen (ed.), The Socratic Tradition: Questioning as Philosophy and as Method. Texts in philosophy. pp. 223-251.

Add more references