Dialectica 62 (4):495-507 (2008)

Authors
Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University
Abstract
Cases involving clandestine manipulation pose a significant challenge to compatibilist conceptions of free will. But compatibilists often argue that they are not alone and that modest libertarian conceptions of free will are also susceptible to the problem. I take issue with this claim. I argue that agent‐causal libertarian views are not susceptible to the problem. I then argue that the compatibilist cannot cite a relevant difference between agent‐causal libertarian views and modest libertarian views. Therefore from a compatibilist's perspective modest libertarian views are impervious to the problem of clandestine manipulation.
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DOI 10.1111/dltc.2008.62.issue-4
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References found in this work BETA

Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Living Without Free Will.Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):169-192.
Deontic Morality and Control.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):492-495.

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