Metaphysical realism and moral relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam's reason, truth and history

Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):568-575 (1982)
Abstract
Putnam rejects "metaphysical realism," which takes "the world" to be a single complex thing, a connected causal or explanatory order into which all facts fit. he argues that such metaphysical realism is responsible for views he finds implausible; in particular, it can lead to moral relativism when one tries to locate the place of value in the world of fact. i agree that metaphysical realism will lead a thoughtful philosopher to moral relativism, but find neither of these views implausible. in particular, putnam's main argument against metaphysical realism seems fallacious and his suggested alternative, to think of truth as the idea limit of rational inquiry, is clearly incorrect.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X  
DOI 10.2307/2026318
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A Putnam's Progress.Ernest Lepore & Barry Loewer - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):459-473.
Perspectives on Intentional Realism.David Davies - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):264-285.

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