Moral responsibility and the principle of avoidable blame

Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 3 (1):37–46 (2004)
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Abstract

Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is important about PAP such that the refutation of PAP is of no concern as long as PAB survives.

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Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Moral dilemmas.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1988 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.

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