Moral relativism defended

Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22 (1975)

Gilbert Harman
Princeton University
Gilbert harman has recently proposed a version of moral relativism which is markedly clearer than any earlier statement of that position. Besides consistency and clarity, Harman claims for his thesis a number of positive virtues. The thesis, He argues, "helps explain otherwise puzzling aspects of our moral views"; it accounts for "a previously unnoticed distinction between inner and non-Inner judgments"' and it allows us to meet traditional objections to related theories. In this paper, I argue that none of these alleged virtues is adequately documented by harman's arguments
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DOI 10.2307/2184078
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