Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):275-284 (2004)
In the first two sections of the paper, some basic terminological distinctions regarding “freedom of the will” as a philosophical problem are expounded and discussed. On this basis, the third section focuses on the examination of two neurophysiological experiments (one by Benjamin Libet and one by William Grey Walter), which in recent times are often interpreted as providing an empirical vindication of determinism and, accordingly, a refutation of positions maintaining freedom of the will. It will be argued that both experiments fall short in this respect, and that in general—for methodical reasons—the prospects of ever deciding the dispute about freedom of the will through empirical research are rather poor.
|Keywords||free will neurophysiology Benjamin Libet William Grey Walter determinism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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