Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem [Book Review]

Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54 (1991)
Authors
Stevan Harnad
Université du Québec à Montréal
Abstract
Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is "everything" a body with a mind can do? Turing's original "pen-pal" version (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body.
Keywords Artificial intelligence  causality  cognition  computation  explanation  mind/body problem  other-minds problem  robotics  Searle  symbol grounding  Turing Test
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,457
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.

View all 52 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
136 ( #44,279 of 2,285,031 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #96,213 of 2,285,031 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature