Authors
Orna Harari
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
I examine the question why in Proclus' view genetic processes provide demonstrative explanations, in light of the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of demonstration in late antiquity. I show that in this interpretation mathematics is not an explanatory science in the strict sense because its objects, being immaterial, do not admit causal explanation. Placing Proclus' account of demonstrative explanation in this context, I argue that this account is aimed at answering the question whether mathematical proofs provide causal explanation as opposed to grounds. I show further that Proclus can answer this question in the affirmative due to his realist view of mathematical objects and the priority he ascribes to causal relations over logical relations.
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DOI 10.1515/AGPH.2008.006
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Viewing-as Explanations and Ontic Dependence.William D’Alessandro - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):769-792.
Logic and Mathematics in the Seventeenth Century.Massimo Mugnai - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (4):297-314.

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