Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief

In Reasoning, meaning, and mind. New York: Oxford University Press (1999)
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Abstract

Discusses how to explain the distinction between epistemic and non‐epistemic reasons while allowing epistemic reasons to be affected by pragmatic considerations of simplicity, coherence, and conservatism. After noting difficulties with trying to explain epistemic reasons in terms of connections with truth or the goal of believing what is true, the chapter discusses issues about the nature of probability, suggesting that epistemic reasons connect with conditional probability in a way that non‐epistemic reasons do not.

Other Versions

original Harman, Gilbert (1997) "Pragmatism and reasons for belief". In Kulp, Christopher B., Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, pp. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (1997)

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Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.

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