Quine on analyticity and logical truth

Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):249-255 (1969)
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Quine claims that the analytic-synthetic distinction lacks a proper characterization of a notion to be used to reduce analytic statements "depending upon essential predication" to logically true statements. the author shows that the same arguments used by quine against analyticity can also be used against logical truth; if one notion is "given up", the other must be also. notions such as "filling blanks alike" and "identical propositions" presupposed by logical truth have the same deficiencies as does analyticity. logical truth is not more basic than analyticity; the two notions stand or fall together



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