Rule utilitarianism and decision theory

Erkenntnis 11 (1):25 - 53 (1977)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show how some of the controversial questions concerning utilitarianism can be clarified by the modelling techniques and the other analytical tools of decision theory (and, sometimes, of game theory). It is suggested that the moral rules of utilitarian ethics have a logical status similar to that of the normative rules (theorems) of such formal normative disciplines as decision theory and game theory.The paper argues that social utility should be defined, not in hedonistic or in ideal-utilitarian terms, but rather in terms of individual preferences, in accordance with the author's equiprobability model of moral value judgments.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00169843
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References found in this work BETA
The Language of Morals.R. M. Hare - 1952 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Freedom and Reason.R. M. Hare - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Two Concepts of Rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.

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Citations of this work BETA
On the Incoherence Objection to Rule-Utilitarianism.Alex Rajczi - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):857-876.

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