Scientific Method: Realism, Reference and Theory

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 24:53-68 (1988)
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Abstract

The claim of this paper is that only by adopting an approach to the analysis of theorizing based on the highlighting of analogy relations, that is on an analysis of the content of theories, can a defensible form of realism be found.

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Rom Harré
Last affiliation: Oxford University

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References found in this work

Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.

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