Self, Sense and Autonomy

Abstract

This study advances a refutation of Physicalism. It demonstrates that it cannot, coherently, be maintained. An alternative approach based on Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego’ is developed. This is an account where the physical world is constituted by a freely acting self from a phenomenology that is ontologically neutral. By doing so, the, so-called, ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is dissolved. It will be shown that the self is compelled to attribute moral and aesthetic value to the world that it has constituted. The determinism that Physicalism engenders is shown to lead to a nihilism that makes all knowledge impossible. Genuine personal responsibility for action, is asserted within strict limits. A position is outlined that gives a role to the self in causation and one that entails the possibility of panpsychism.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Qualia domesticated.Roberto Casati - 2002 - In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (2):doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010.
Free will and mental quausation.Sara Bernstein & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):310-331.
The Universe in Consciousness.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):125-155.
The Mental Causation Debate.Tim Crane - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (Supplementary):211-36.
Husserl and the Mind–Body Problem.Emiliano Trizio - 2011 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 11:1-15.
Husserl and the Mind–Body Problem.Emiliano Trizio - 2011 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 11:1-15.
Four conceptions of the hard problem of consciousness.Jonathan Eric Dorsey - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):129-44.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-31

Downloads
222 (#91,236)

6 months
64 (#74,739)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew Ian Harding
University of Edinburgh (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references