The absolute ought and the unique individual

Husserl Studies 22 (3):223-240 (2006)
The referent of the transcendental and indexical “I” is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with “the personal I” which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The “absolute Ought” is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in “the truth of will.” Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more precise Husserl's ethical position.
Keywords I  Person  Individual  Absolute Ought  Truth of will  Georg Simmel
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DOI 10.1007/s10743-006-9009-4
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Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1964). Werke. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, F. Frommann.

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