The case for hyper-libertarianism


Authors
Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University
Abstract
The hyper libertarian is compatibilist about control, but incompatibilist about free will. This paper argues that such a position has more to recommend it than either compatibilism or traditional libertarianism. It combines what is strongest about both positions, without encountering their principle weaknesses. Furthermore it has the resources to help render intelligible the reality of moral luck.
Keywords libertarian  compatibilist  free will  libertarianism  moral luck
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