The case for hyper-libertarianism

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):1-6 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The hyper libertarian is compatibilist about control, but incompatibilist about free will. This paper argues that such a position has more to recommend it than either compatibilism or traditional libertarianism. It combines what is strongest about both positions, without encountering their principle weaknesses. Furthermore it has the resources to help render intelligible the reality of moral luck.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Libertarianism, luck, and action explanation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
Libertarianism, luck, and control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent.Roger Clarke - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):139-49.
Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Kane, luck, and the significance of free will.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
Chisholm on freedom.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (5):630-648.
What's wrong with Libertarianism. [REVIEW]Jeffrey Friedman - 1997 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 11 (3):407-467.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-03-05

Downloads
46 (#337,879)

6 months
6 (#504,917)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references