The impossibility of ‘possible’ worlds

Philosophy 74 (1):5-28 (1999)
The gist of these objections to the possible world account of necessity is that, for it to be true, ‘possible’ would have to be a name for an attribute. But to say that something is possible is not to describe it, but to say that there could be such a thing. And possibilities are not classes of entities. Possible worlds have been described as ways, but a way of getting to London from Cambridge is not an entity, and that there is a way is entailed by facts such as that if you travel south along the M3, you will get there.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819199001023
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,820
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
New Aspects of the Probabilistic Evaluation of Hypotheses and Experience.Rainer Gottlob - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):147 – 163.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
60 ( #94,850 of 2,210,225 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #223,929 of 2,210,225 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature