The impossibility of ‘possible’ worlds

Philosophy 74 (1):5-28 (1999)
The gist of these objections to the possible world account of necessity is that, for it to be true, ‘possible’ would have to be a name for an attribute. But to say that something is possible is not to describe it, but to say that there could be such a thing. And possibilities are not classes of entities. Possible worlds have been described as ways, but a way of getting to London from Cambridge is not an entity, and that there is a way is entailed by facts such as that if you travel south along the M3, you will get there.
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819199001023
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Rainer Gottlob (2000). New Aspects of the Probabilistic Evaluation of Hypotheses and Experience. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):147 – 163.

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