The Relation-Theory of Mental Acts: Durand of St.-Pourcain on the Ontological Status of Mental Acts

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 7:186-211 (2019)
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Abstract

The relation-theory of mental acts proposes that a mental act is a kind of relative entity founded upon the mind and directed at the object of perception or thought. While most medieval philosophers recognized that there is something importantly relational about thought, they nevertheless rejected the view that mental acts are wholly relations. Rather, the dominant view was that a mental act is either in whole or part an Aristotelian quality added to the mind upon which such a relation to the object can be founded. In this paper, I examine Durand of St.-Pourçain's defense of the relation-theory of mental acts against two objections raised against it: the first from John Duns Scotus, among others, and the second from an anonymous Thomist and Adam Wodeham.

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Peter Hartman
Loyola University, Chicago