What Are Epistemic Reasons?

Philosophia Christi 19 (1):23-36 (2017)
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Abstract

Epistemic reasons exist indubitably, yet confusion surrounds just what exactly they are, in and of themselves. In this paper I argue that there is only one thing they could credibly be: the favoring attitudes a god is adopting toward us believing what is true and following methods of belief formation likely to result in true beliefs. As the existence of epistemic reasons is indubitable then if this analysis is correct, it will provide us with an apparent proof of a god’s existence.

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Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University

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