The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:41-55 (2000)
With some notable exceptions, feminist epistemologists have not focused (like many contemporary analytic epistemologists) on the the semantics of claims to know: What are the truth conditions of claims of the form S knows that p? My goal in this paper is to suggest a way of approaching the task of specifying the truth conditions for knowledge while (hopefully) making clear how a broad range of feminist work that is often deemed irrelevant to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge is, in fact, highly relevant. My discussion may also show (though I’m not going to take this up explicitly) that there are reasons why the search for truth conditions for knowledge could have a legitimate place in feminist epistemological inquiry
|Keywords||Conference Proceedings Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Knowledge Without Truth.Priyedarshi Jetli - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:97-103.
From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
D Efeating the Dogma of Defeasibility.Ram Neta - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--82.
Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.Ernest Sosa - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1):1-16.
Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.
Is This a World Where Knowledge has to Include Justification?Stephen Hetherington - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41–69.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads69 ( #75,542 of 2,163,904 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #129,223 of 2,163,904 )
How can I increase my downloads?