Philosophical analysis and social kinds

Abstract
[Sally Haslanger] In debates over the existence and nature of social kinds such as 'race' and 'gender', philosophers often rely heavily on our intuitions about the nature of the kind. Following this strategy, philosophers often reject social constructionist analyses, suggesting that they change rather than capture the meaning of the kind terms. However, given that social constructionists are often trying to debunk our ordinary (and ideology-ridden?) understandings of social kinds, it is not surprising that their analyses are counterintuitive. This article argues that externalist insights from the critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction can be extended to justify social constructionist analyses. /// [Jennifer Saul] Sally Haslanger's 'What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds' is, among other things, a part of the theoretical underpinning for analyses of race and gender concepts that she discusses far more fully elsewhere. My reply focuses on these analyses of race and gender concepts, exploring the ways in which the theoretical work done in this paper and others can or cannot be used to defend these analyses against certain objections. I argue that the problems faced by Haslanger's analyses are in some ways less serious, and in some ways more serious, than they may at first appear. Along the way, I suggest that ordinary speakers may not in fact have race and gender concepts and I explore the ramifications of this claim.
Keywords ideology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2006.00128.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,157
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Going Beyond the Fundamental: Feminism in Contemporary Metaphysics.Elizabeth Barnes - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):335-351.
What Is Social Construction?E. Diaz-Leon - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1137-1152.
Gender Concepts and Intuitions.Mari Mikkola - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 559-583.
Revisionary Epistemology.Davide Fassio & Robin McKenna - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):755-779.
Gender Concepts and Intuitions.Mari Mikkola - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):559-583.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds.Sally Haslanger - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):89-118.
Three Kinds of Social Kinds.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):96-112.
Metaphysics of Classical and Nonclassical Kinds of Social Realities.Shelud’ko Grigoriy Vladimirovich - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:333-336.
Pluralism and Rationality in the Social Sciences.Ingvar Johansson - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (4):427-443.
Ontology and Social Construction.Sally Haslanger - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (2):95-125.
Two Kinds of Commitments (and Two Kinds of Social Groups).Talbot M. Brewer - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):554–583.
On for Someone's Sake Attitudes.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411.
Half-Naturalized Social Kinds.Richard W. Miller - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):652.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-09-13

Total downloads

256 ( #13,329 of 2,171,972 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

32 ( #8,925 of 2,171,972 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums