Dissertation, Oslo (2014)
AbstractPanpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003;Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting for the intrinsic nature of the physical itself (Strawson 2006, Seager 2006). In this thesis, I show that panpsychism can also be defended on the basis of an argument from our (arguable) acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. This argument has made frequent appearances throughout the history of philosophy, with philosophers such as Leibniz, Schopenhauer and James, and I construct and defend an updated version of it. Furthermore, I offer a solution to the combination problem: how can complex (human and animal-type) consciousness result from simple (fundamental particle-type) consciousness? This is generally regarded as the most serious problem facing contemporary panpsychism. I propose that mental combination can be construed as kind causal process culminating in a fusion, and show how this avoids the main difficulties with accounting for mental combination.
Similar books and articles
The Phenomenal Bonding Solution} to the Combination Problem.Philip Goff - 2016 - In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 283--302.
Kicking the Psychophysical Laws Into Gear A New Approach to the Combination Problem.Tam Hunt - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does Not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. [REVIEW]Itay Shani - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):413-434.
The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties.S. C. Gibb - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.
Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism.William Seager - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):272-88.
The 'Intrinsic Nature' Argument for Panpsychism.William E. Seager - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.
Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? [REVIEW]Christian Onof - 2009 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (1-2).
Van Gulick’s Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited.Janez Bregant - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
Panpsychism—a Neglected Jamesian Alternative?Sami Pihlström - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:319-347.
Panpsychism, Aggregation and Combinatorial Infusion.William Seager - 2010 - Mind and Matter 8 (2):167-184.
Argument z superweniencji a niekonstruktywny naturalizm.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2008 - Filozofia Nauki 3.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives.Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Argument for Panpsychism From Experience of Causation.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
Panpsychism and the First-Person Perspective: The Case for Panpsychist Idealism.Brentyn Ramm - 2021 - Mind and Matter 19 (1):75-106.
References found in this work
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.