Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):366-370 (1998)

Authors
William Hasker
Huntington University
Abstract
Most critics of Richard Swinburne’s modal argument for mind-body substance dualism have alleged that the argument is unsound, either because its premises are false or because it commits a modal fallacy. I show that the argument is epistemically circular, and thus provides no support for its conclusion even if it is sound.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI faithphil199815331
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References found in this work BETA

Reply to Stump and Kretzmann.Richard Swinburne - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):413 - 414.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can I Survive Without My Body? Undercutting the Modal Argument.Joshua Mugg - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):71-92.

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