Emotional feelings and intentionalism

In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-111 (2003)
Authors
Anthony Hatzimoysis
University of Athens
Abstract
Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind
Keywords Emotion  Feeling  Intentionalism  Mental States  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100007918
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